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SECURITY DEVICES
Michael H. Rubin*
PLEDGE AND ASSIGNMENT
Practitioners often style certain security devices as both an
"assignment and pledge." Although often used interchangeably by
both judges' and legislators,' theoretically the two concepts are
distinct.3 A pledge is a giving of possession to secure a loan;' an
assignment is a true transfer of title.' The Assignment of Accounts
Receivable Act' provides that a perfected assignment under the Act
will be treated as a pledge.'
Because security devices are stricti juris,8 security devices must
be properly drafted and perfected in order to affect third parties.
The problem of how to obtain a security device on a partnership in-
terest arose in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Louisiana Savings
Association.' In that case a "nominee" corporation was formed to ac-
quire.a ground lease on property belonging to a third person. In actu-
ality, the property was being developed by a partnership, each of
the three partners owning an equal share of the partnership and of
the corporation. The nominee corporation was to act as agent for the
partnership in the financing of the construction."0 One of the part-
ners borrowed funds from the plaintiff bank and "secured" the loan
by an "assignment and pledge' of his partnership interest. The part-
ner did not pledge the stock of the corporation, nor was any mort-
gage placed upon the property. The "assignment and pledge" docu-
ment was then recorded in the parish conveyance books.
* Member, Louisiana State Bar Association.
1. Compare Caffin v. Kerwan, 7 La. Ann. 221 (1832) with LA. R.S. 9:4321-4323
(1950) & 9:4324 (Supp. 1978).
2. LA. R.S. 9:3101 (Supp. 1952, 1964 & 1980).
3. Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 374, 91 So. 2d 569, 571 (1956).
4. 231 La. at 374, 91 So. 2d at 571.
5. 231 La. at 374, 91 So. 2d at 571.
b. LA. 1R.S. 9:3101-311 J Mupp. 1952, 194 & 1980).
7. LA. R.S. 9:3102(B) (Supp. 1952 & 1980).
8. Civil Code article 3183 requires that a debtor's property is to be divided pro-
rata between his creditors unless there exist "some lawful causes of preference."
9. 386 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
10. Since the partnership was not a limited one, it could not borrow funds at a
rate free from the then legal usury provisions. See LA. R.S. 12:703 (Supp. 1965, 1969.
1970 & 1977) (as it appeared prior to the enactment of LA. R.S. 9:3509 (Supp. 1981) by
1981 La. Acts, No. 665, § 1).
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The court, noting that, under the instrument, the bank did not
assume any obligations of the partner but merely was to receive the
partner's interest "in any income" produced, held that the document
could not have been a pledge." Rather, the court held that the docu-
ment was an assignment which served as "a security device."'" The
court then reasoned that since the assignment had been recorded in
the parish conveyance records, the bank acquired a "privilege" effec-
tive against third parties upon recordation.'"
The court's language and reasoning is somewhat puzzling. If the
document was an "assignment," then no "privilege" would ever arise
because an assignment cannot, by definition, be a security device."
An assignment is a sale; a pledge is a security device.
Perhaps the results of the case can be justified on the grounds
that sections 4321 to 4324 of Title 9 of the 1950 Louisiana Revised
Statutes authorizes a pledge of incorporeal rights not evidenced by
a written instrument. 6 The interest is perfected as to third parties
under this statute by the execution of a written act of pledge, and,
in some cases, recordation. In the alternative, it may be argued that
the right to receive income accruing to a partnership interest is a
type of "account receivable" contemplated by the Louisiana Ac-
counts Receivable Act.'" In such an instance, the assignment could
have been perfected by recording a "statement of assignment" in
the prescribed form in the parish conveyance records.
11. 386 So. 2d at 104-05.
12. Id. at 105.
13. Id. at 111.
14. The court relied upon the case of Dauzat v. Simmesport State Bank, 167 So.
2d 681 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), for the proposition that an assignment may serve as a
security device. However, both the language of the Civil Code and the holding of Scott
iv. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956) are clear. An assignment is a sale, a
transfer of title; a pledge is a transfer of possession in order to grant security for a
debt.
15. The partnership agreement in this case was not in writing. An instrument not
evidenced in writing, however, can be written. The criteria for using sections 4321 to
4324 is whether the possession of the instrument gives the possessor any rights mere-
ly by possession, e.g., a negotiable note. If so, the pledge must be perfected under
Civil Code article 3158. If not. then the pledge of written instruments whose mere
possession does not ex-co4 tt~ p~5osso 5.O.' sup~qc ckht cf. 2. tt%.st, 'Mpitv
ship interest is perfected under sections 4321 to 4324.
16. LA. R.S. 9:3101 (Supp. 1952, 1964 & 1980) defines an account receivable as:
any indebtedness, or part thereof, due to or arising out of the sale of goods or the
performance of services, or the leasing of movable or immovable property, by the
assignor in connection with any business, profession, occupation,. or undertaking
of the assignor that is carried on wholly or partly in the State of Louisiana, other
than (a) indebtedness due to or arising out of claims in tort, and (b) indebtedness
evidenced by a promissory note or a negotiable instrument, and (c) indebtedness
secured by a mortgage, a chattel mortgage, or a pledge.
17. LA. R.S. 9:3103 (Supp. 1952 & 1980).
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Judge Culpepper, in his dissent, makes a persuasive argument
that while, as between the parties, some type of security interest
may have arisen, the interest could not have affected third parties.
A question involving a secured interest in a lease arose in
Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism v. Fort McComb
Development Corp.8 One of the arguments asserted in that case, in
an attempt to have a mortgage of a lease cancelled, was that there
had been confusion when the lease had been "assigned" to the mort-
gagee. The court held that the assignment "merely represented a
security device in order to further secure the advance of money .... "
Since it was "only" a security device, there was no confusion and
the mortgage of the lease remained valid.'
In light of the continued uncertainty of the jurisprudence, it is
apparently not only desirable but advisable for the cautious practi-
tioner to term a security device on property as to which there is no
express statutory authority for the creation of security devices as
both an "assignment and pledge."
STOCK PLEDGE
In Defelice v. Garon,2" the issue was whether a contract
denominated as a "voting trust agreement" sufficed as a pledge of
stock if the voting trust itself did not meet the statutory re-
quirements for such trusts. The court of appeals had held that a
pledge had been created;" however, the supreme court, in an opinion
on rehearing, noted that certain facts had been presented to the
court that rendered the case presumptively moot." Before reman-
ding the case for a further determination of facts, the court did
entertain the merits of the matter, and noted that even if the voting
trust agreement could be reformed to create a pledge between the
parties, such an issue was not properly determined by means of a
summary judgment. 2' The cautious practitioner is advised, in the
creation of voting trust agreements, to expressly follow the condi-
tions of the statute.25 Conversely, the creation of a stock pledge
should be express. While, no instrument is necessary to make a
18. 385 So. 2d 1233 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
19. Id. at 1236.
20. A mortgage of a lessee's interest of a lease is expressly authorized by LA.
R.S. 9:5102 (1950).
21. 395 So. 2d 658 (La. 1980), reversing 380 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
The lower court's opinion was noted in Rubin. Developments in the Law,
1979-1980-Security Devices, 41 LA. L. REv. 389. 397 (1981).
22. 395 So. 2d at 659.
23. Id. at 661-62.
24. Id. at 662-63.
25. LA. R.S. 12:78 (1950).
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pledge of stock effective as between the parties or as to the world,"
it is always advisable to have a document setting forth the true intent
of the parties so there will be no dispute at a later date as to the
type of security device created.
PLEDGE OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Civil Code article 3156, unchanged since 1870, has required that,
for a negotiable instrument to be pledged, it must be endorsed to
the order of the pledgee if the instrument is not bearer paper. As a
practical matter, a pledgee should insist upon such an endorsement
so that he will have the right to enforce the pledge if it becomes due
prior to the underlying obligation' or if there is a default in the
underlying obligation. 8
Some question has arisen whether, as to third parties, one can
ever perfect a pledge of a negotiable instrument that has not been
endorsed to the order of the pledgee. This question is particularly
important now that Louisiana has adopted portions of the Uniform
Commercial Code,"o because under the U.C.C. a holder of an instru-
ment has a legal right to obtain an endorsement from the transferor
at any time." The 1981 legislative amendment to Civil Code article
3156"' has obviated this problem by deleting the requirement that
the instrument be endorsed prior to its being pledged.
SURETYSHIP
Most, negotiable instrumets in Loaisiana contaim "boileT ate"
waivers by which endorsers bind themselves in solido with the
maker, waive the benefits of division and discussion, and waive
presentment, demand, and notice of protest.
While the law that applies to negotiable instruments in osten-
sibly the Uniform Commerical Code,32 differing courts have applied
different rules to accommodation parties. Some courts look solely to
the U.C.C. or its predecessor, the Negotiable Instruments Law."3
26. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3158 (mere delivery of the stock is sufficient to make a
pledge effective).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3170.
28. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3157.
29. As adopted by Louisiana, articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of the U.C.C are called the
Louisiana Commercial Laws. LA. R.S. 10:1-101, added by 1974 La. Acts, No. 92, § 1.
30. LA. R.S. 10:3-201(3) (Supp. 1974).
31. As amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 315, § 1.
32. LA. R.S. 10:1-101 (Supp. 1974).
33. LA. R.S. 7:1-125 (1950). See, e.g., American Discount Corp. v. Glover, 391 So.
2d 853 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Haik v. Rowley, 377 So. 2d 391 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979),
writ refused, 378 So. 2d 1383 (La. 1980).
[Vol. 42
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Some courts apply only the Civil Code articles on solidary obliga-
tions." Other courts have applied the law of suretyship as between
accommodation endorsers and the law of solidary obligations as be-
tween accommodation co-makers. The practitioner has available dif-
fering lines of jurisprudence on which to rely, depending upon what
position he seeks to assert. Examples of the continuing jurispruden-
tial disputes as to what law to apply can be found in Smith v.
White,3 Bourg v. Wiley,"3 and Daigle v. Chaisson."
Both Smith and Bourg involved accommodation makers. In both
instances an accommodation maker, who did not directly receive the
benefit of the funds advanced under the note, paid the note without
the necessity of a lawsuit. In both instances the accommodation
maker filed suit against a co-maker to recover the funds that had
been paid to the holder of the note.
In Bourg, the court used the rules governing solidary obligors
and applied Civil Code article 2104 to grant the plaintiff contribution
from the co-maker. The court reasoned that payment of the note by
the plaintiff, an accommodation maker, extinguished the note; the
court then found that thereby the plaintiff could pursue his remedy
under the solidary obligation articles. The court expressly relied on
the supreme court's opinion in Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens
Land Development Co."9 for the proposition that the plaintiff could
not collect his attorney's fees from the co-maker.
The Bourg court was incorrect in holding that, under the U.C.C.,
payment by a co-maker extinguishes the note. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 10:3-415 expressly provides that if an accommodation party
pays an instrument, the party "has a right of recourse on the instru-
ment against [the party accommodated].""0 This fact was noted in the
Smith case and the court allowed the accommodation maker a right
of recourse "on the instrument" against the principal maker for all
sums paid, plus legal interest, but, nevertheless (without citing
Aiavolasiti) denied attorney's fees to an accommodation maker,
34. Wisconsin Capital Corp. v. Trans World Land Title Corp., 378 So. 2d 495 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1979).
35. Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Dev. Co. 371 So. Zd 755 (La. 1979..
36. 398 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
37. 398 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
38. 396 So. 2d 573 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
39. 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979). The holding in Aiavolasiti has been subject to
criticism. See Rubin, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts,
1978-1979-Security Devices, 40 LA. L. REV. 572 (1980); Note, Aiavolasiti A Conflict
Resolved, A Conflict Ignored, 40 LA. L. REV. 483 (1980): Note, Louisiana Supreme
Court Clarifies the Solidary Surety's Right to Contribution, 25 LoY. L. REV. 70 (1979).
40. (Emphasis added).
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because the note contained no express provision allowing attorney's
fees. Thus, the court in Smith applied the rules of the U.C.C., not
the rules of suretyship or of solidary obligations.
The rationale of Smith is preferable to that in Bourg. The U.C.C.
contains express provisions concerning the relationship between ac-
commodation parties. There is therefore no need to resort to the law
of suretyship or solidary obligations."' The Smjth court need not
have concluded, however, that no attorney's fees are awardable
when an accommodation maker sues his co-maker for indemnity. If
the co-maker has a right to sue "on the instrument," he should have
the right to all of the remedies available to a holder, since he is
subrogated to the status of a holder when he sues "on the instru-
ment."'  Therefore, the fact that the instrument itself does not ex-
pressly grant attorney's fees to accommodation makers appears to
be irrelevant.
In the third case, Daigle, a husband and wife signed as accom-
modation endorsers along with a third party on a note of an in-
dividual. The individual maker became bankrupt and the husband
and wife paid the note in order to avoid suit. The husband then
brought suit against the remaining endorser seeking to collect, in
the alternative, either all that the husband had paid on the note to
the original holder or one-half of that amount. The appellate court
awarded the plaintiff a one-third recovery representing defendant
accommodation endorser's virile share, but the court refused to
grant the plaintiff's attorney's fees. The court considered but re-
jected the argument that Revised Statutes 10:3-415(5)'" allows an ac-
commodation endorser who pays the right to collect attorney's fees
from his co-endorsers. The court construed the statute as applying
only to rights of an endorser against the maker, not against other
accommodation endorsers." The court expressly followed the rules
41. LA. R.S. 10:1-103 (Supp. 1974) provides that,
"Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Title, the other Laws of
Louisiana shall apply."
The comment of the Louisiana State Law Institute provides:
The original U.C.C. text was rejected because it refers to concepts and terms
either unknown to Louisiana or having different meaning in Louisiana. The thrust
ol the section is that the rest oi Louisiana law implements the commexrial law i a
situation is not covered by the commercial Law. The Louisiana version says this
without limitations.
42. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2161 provides: "Subrogation takes place of right: . . . [rot
the benefit of him who, being bound with others, or for others, for the payment of the
debt, had an interest in discharging it."
43. LA. R.S. 10:3-415(5) (Supp. 1974) provides: "An accommodation party is not
liable to the party accommodated, and if he pays the instrument has a right of
recourse on the instrument against such party."
44. The court stated:
The rule which Section 3-415(5) makes clear is that an accommodation party is not
[Vol. 42
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set forth by the supreme court in Aiavolasiti and limited the
recovery to the virile share of the actual funds paid by the accom-
modation endorser to discharge the debt plus legal interest. The
court noted that AiavoZasiti treated accommodation endorsers as
sureties as between themselves, and therefore applied the rules of
contribution between sureties under article 3058 of the Civil Code.
The court further followed Aiavolasiti in permitting contribution
even though no lawsuit had been filed prior to payment'" because of
the jurisprudentially created rule that a lawsuit is not a, prerequisite
to contribution if a co-surety had knowledge that the debt was due
or consented to payment." The court in Daigle indicated that
perhaps the endorser would have been entitled to attorney's fees
had he claimed these in his prayer.'
It is submitted that the court in Daigle could have avoided the
conclusion that the U.C.C. contains "no provisions for indemnifica-
tion or contribution amongst accommodation indorsers, once the pre-
sumption of Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:3-414(2) is overcome.... ,
While the presumption in section 3-414(2) is that an accommodation
endorser is entitled to 100 percent indemnity from the endorser who
signs above him, this presumption is rebuttable."' If an indorser is
entitled to pay an instrument and sue the maker "on the
instrument" (which suit on the "instrument" should give the en-
dorser the right to attorney's fees, since he would be subrogated to
the rights of the holder of the instrument),"0 it is a questionable
policy distinction to deny attorney's fees when the suit is against a
liable to the party accommodated, whoever he be, and if an accommodation party
pays the instrument he has a right of recourse on the instrument against such
party, meaning the party accommodated. We cannot construe Subsection (5) as
meaning that where.one of two or more accommodation .co-indorsers agrees to be
bound in solido to pay the principal obligation, as in the present case, that one of
the accommodation parties can pay the instrument and sue the other accommoda-
tion parties "on the instrument" for the principal debt, interest, attorney's fees,
etc.
396 So. 2d at 576 (emphasis in original).
45. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3058 states:
When several persons have been sureties for the same debtor and for the
same debt, the surety who has satisfied the debt, has his remedy against the
when such person has paid in consequence of a lawsuit instituted against him.
46. The jurisprudential rule was created in the case of Leigh v. Wright, 192 La.
224, 187 So. 649 (1939).
47. The plaintiff apparently had prayed for attorney's fees in his claim for indem-
nification but omitted this prayer from his contribution claim. 396 So. 2d at 578.
48. 396 So. 2d at 577.
49. See the official comment to U.C.C. §3-414 (1978 version). See also Aiavolasiti
v. Versailles Gardens Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979).
50. See note 42, supra. But see Smith v. White, 398 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1981).
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co-endorser. In fact, as a policy matter, such a rule would discourage
endorsers from ever paying the holder without a lawsuit, because
such actions would force the accommodation party to bear his own
legal costs of any subsequent action against the maker (as resulted
from the holding of the Smith case) or against an accommodation
party (as in Daigle and Bourg).
Because the U.C.C. is a uniform law enacted in all fifty states,
the jurisprudence interpreting its provisions should be persuasive
authority. Other states have held that an accommodation party is
entitled to attorney's fees, whether he sues the maker or other ac-
commodation parties."
Until this matter is clarified by the Louisiana Supreme Court or
by legislation, the cautious practitioner will want to be careful about
advising an accommodation endorser to pay the instrument if there
is any question that the other accommodating parties or the maker
may be reluctant to pay. It may 'be better to wait until a lawsuit,
with all its detrimental effects, in order to bring all the parties
before the court at one time and to avoid making a party who is in-
itially willing to pay bear the costs of attorney's fees in a subse-
quent action to collect in contribution or indemnity "on the instru-
ment" from others. Further, if an accommodation endorser does
decide to pay, the practitioner will want to be sure that there is
notice to the other accommodation parties under the provisions of
Civil Code article 3058 in the event the court determines that this
article should be applied to the facts.
The current uncertainty about the applicable law in the
suretyship area also extends to continuing guarantees. In Parrino v.
Pa-ino,2 a husband, his wife, and a third party signed a continuing
guaranty for a corporation. When the corporation was unable to pay,
the husband and wife paid the obligation and then sued the third
guarantor. The third guarantor contended that Civil Code article
3058 prohibits contribution from a co-surety if payment was made in
the absence of a lawsuit. The court held that the plaintiff had stated
a cause of action for contribution, notwithstanding the express
terms of article 3058, because the language of the guaranty agree-
ment "created a solidary obligation, not only with the principal deb-
tor but among the sureties themselves."" Relying upon obiter dic-
tum in the supreme court's decision in Louisiana Bank & Trust Co.,
Crowley v. Boutte,5' the court in Parrino noted that there is no need
to wait until a lawsuit until being entitled to contribution from a
51. See Deg v. Matthews, 10 Wash. App. 936, 520 P.2d 1385 (1974).
52. 393 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
53. Id at 763.
54. 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975).
[Vol. 42
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"solidary surety."5 It is interesting to note that the Parrino court
did not refer to the supreme court's later opinion in Aiavolasiti,
which had expressly held that while the language of a continuing
guaranty may make the guarantors liable in solido to the creditor,
as between themselves they remain but sureties."
Under both Boutte and Aiavolasiti, the rule that emerges is
that, from the creditor's view, co-sureties bound in solido are viewed
as solidary obligors; however, as between themselves, "solidary
sureties" are merely sureties. As a result of these cases, and of Par-
rino, there are now apparently two jurisprudentially created excep-
tions to the express language of Civil Code article 3058. A co-surety
is entitled to contribution even if he pays the creditor without being
sued if either (a) he is a "solidary surety," or (b) the other surety
had knowledge of the payment or consented to it.
It is submitted that to avoid further confusion in the future, arti-
cle 3058 of the Civil Code should be amended to expressly provide
for contribution between sureties without the necessity of a lawsuit
being filed by the creditor; it should also allow the paying surety to
recover attorney's fees if provided for in the principal obligation.
CREATION OF A SURETYSHIP CONTRACT
A contract of suretyship must be in writing; it may not be oral." A
contract which creates a principal obligation (as opposed to an ac-
cessory obligation such as suretyship), however, may be oral."
Therefore, the question in enforcing an oral promise is whether it is
a principal obligation or whether it is merely an offer to pay the
debt of a third person should that third person default. Seashell. Inc.
v. Simon,59 found that an individual had merely guaranteed debts of
a corporation rather than undertaking a second, independent obliga-
tion to pay the corporation's open account. Since the individual's
promise was not in writing, it could not be enforced against him.
COLLATERAL MORTGAGES
The purpose of a collateral mortgage is twofold. First, it allows
the mortgagor to secure a fluctuating line of credit without the ex-
ecution of additional acts of mortgage."0 Second, it protects the
55. ld. at 764.
56. 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979).
57. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2278(3).
58. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1762, 1771 & 2278.
59. 398 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
60. An ordinary mortgage cannot secure new advances after the original loan has
been paid. LA. Cry. CODE arts. 3376 & 3378. See Sanders v. Pasternak, 386 So. 2d 685
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); cf. Nathan & Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage, 33 LA. L.
REV. 497 (1973).
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lender by giving him a secured position on the property as of the
date of the pledge of the collateral mortgage note, even though ad-
vances may not take place until some point in the future.6 In
deciding whether the parties intended future loans to be secured by
the collateral mortgage, one must look to the intent of the parties at
the time the pledge was given. 2
Since the collateral mortgage note is a negotiable instrument,
the pledge is perfected by mere delivery of the collateral mortgage
note." To help prove intent of the -parties, however, a collateral
pledge agreement is always advisable. 5 In Tallulah Production
Credit Association v. Turner,"6 there was a collateral pledge agree-
ment as well as physical delivery of the collateral mortgage note;
however, when future loans were made, the handnotes did not refer
to the collateral pledge agreement. The court held that there is no
"requirement of a written connection between the subsequent loan
and a pledged collateral mortgage note."6 The court's view is sound
because there is no need to have any written connection between
any loan and the pledged collateral mortgage note." Indeed, a hand-
61. First Guar. Bank v. Alford, 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1978).
62. Id.
63. Typically, the collateral mortgage note is bearer paper payable on demand.
This allows it to be collected or sued upon anytime there is a default in the handnote
or other principal obligation. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3170. Cf. Central Bank v. Bishop, 375
So. 2d 149 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 435 (La. 1979); Rubin, supra note
39, at 583.
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3158 states in part:
[Ilt is further provided that whenever a pledge of any instrument . . . is made to
... secure any other obligations or liabilities of the pledger to the pledgee, then
existing or thereafter arising, up to the limit of the pledge, and the pledged in-
strument or item remains and has remained in the hands of the pledgee, the in-
strument or item may remain in pledge to the pledgee ... to secure.at any time
any renewal or renewals of the original loan or any part thereof or any new or ad-
ditional loans, even though the original loan has been reduced or paid, up to the
total limit which it was agreed should be secured by the pledge, and, if so desired
or provided, to secure any other obligations or liabilities of the pledger to the
pledgee, then existing or thereafter arising up to the limit of the pledge, without
any added notification or other formality, and the pledge shall be valid as well
against third persons as against the pledger thereof, if made in good faith; ...
such . . .additional loans and advances .. .shall be secured by the collateral to
the same extent as if they came into existence when the instrument • . • was
originally pledged and the pledge was made to secure them.
(emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., First Guar. Bank. v. Alford, 366 So. 2d 1299 (La. 1978).
66. 391 So. 2d 885 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), writ refused, 396 So. 2d 900 (La. 1981).
67. Id. at 888 (emphasis in the original).
68. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3158.
[Vol. 42
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note is not even necessary, since the principal obligation secured by
the pledge need not be in writing."
Most negotiable instruments contain a provision automatically
accelerating the entire amount upon default. In some negotiated
transactions, however, the parties may agree to a provision that
grants the borrower a grace period in which to make payments
before a default occurs. Fabacher v. Hammond Dairy Co., Inc." in-
volved such a situation. A handnote was secured by the pledge of a
collateral mortgage package' The handnote provided:
In the event the Maker fails to pay any installment when due,
the holder thereof at its option may upon 10 days written notice
to the Maker, hereby declare all installments immediately due
and payable.7'
U0pon default the creditor proceeded by executory process. The
court held that executory process was not available because there
was no authentic evidence of the giving of notice to the maker.
Executory proceedings are strictly construed" and, with limited
exceptions," every item must be proven by authentic evidence." The
Fabacher court did not accept the verified petition as "authentic
evidence" of the notice."
As a practical matter, a notice that is sent by the mail cannot be
given in "authentic" form. Certainly the debtor will not execute an
authentic act that he has received notice. The creditor can only ex-
ecute an authentic act which states that notice was mailed and attach
to the petition a true copy of the letter along with any certified
return receipt that is received. The only practical difference be-
tween this authentic act and a verified petition is that an authentic
act is executed before a notary and two witnesses, while the
verified petition is normally executed merely in affidavit form.
69. No handnotes were in existence in New Orleans Silversmiths. Inc. v. Toups,
261 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ refused, 262 La. 309, 263 So. 2d 47 (1972); and,
the court still enforced the collateral mortgage. The only statutory requirement of any
kind of connexity between the handnote and the security is a criminal provision ap-
plicable only to banks. LA. B.S. 6:239 (1950).
70. 389 So. 2d 87 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
71. Id. at 92.
72. Reed v. Meaux, 292 So. 2d 557 (La. 1973); Myrtle Grove Packing Co. v. Mones,
226 La. 287, 76 So. 2d 305 (1955); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nolan, 385 So. 2d 1246
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1980). See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2631.
73. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2637.
74. As to evidence that is "deemed" authentic, see LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2636.
75. The requirement for an authentic act is contained in Civil Code article 2234.
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If such a clause is negotiated in a note, it is advisable for the
lender, prior to proceeding by executory process, to either execute
some "authentic" evidence of the %Livia% of notice or, in the alter-
native, to attach a copy of the letter to the petition and have the
petition verified in authentic form.
FORECLOSURE ON MORTGAGES
A mortgage, by its very nature, is indivisible." Therefore, a
mortgage placed on property by one who owns only a partial, un-
divided interest extends over the entire tract." Beene v. Wilbur"8
held that if property is partitioned by licitation and the mortgagee
is not named a party in the licitation suit, his mortgage continues to
exist over the property as a whole after partition. The court relied
on Civil ode aTtkle 113 '39bih Telegates MoTtgagees to the Py'm-
ceeds of the sale by licitation only when the "holders of such mort-
gages, liens, and privileges be made parties to such judicial parti-
tion."
At a judicial sale of property owned by one who is only a partial
owner, a question arises as to what is the proper bid price. At any
judicial sale with appraisal, a two-fold test must be met. The property
must be sold for the greater of (a) two-thirds of its appraised value, 9
or (b) an amount sufficient to satisfy both the costs of the sale and
any mortgages, liens, or privileges that are superior to the seizing
creditor's encumbrance. 0 Of course, the seizing creditor, if he holds
a first moitgage, may allow the propeTty to be sold even thogh the
price is not sufficient to satisfy his mortgage, as long as the two-
thirds rule is met." These rules apply whether the mortgagor owns
a complete or partial interest in the property.
In Barnard v. Barnard8 the court invalidated a judicial sale of a
judgment debtor's one-half interest in property. The amount that.
had been bid at the sheriff's sale. (without appraisal) was not suffi-
cient to pay off a superior mortgage on the entire tract although the
bid had been for more than one-half of the outstanding balance on
the superior mortgage. The holding of Barnard means that if property
is subject to a $1 million superior mortgage, and if the portion
76. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3282.
77. Id. Cf. Erwin v. Orillion, 6 La. 205 (1834) (overruled on other grounds in Suc-
cession of LAMM, 40 La. Ann. 312, 4 So. 53 (1888)); Metcalfe v. Alter, 31 La. Ann. 389
(1879).
78. 388 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 738 (La. 1980).
79. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2336.
80. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2337.
81. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2338.
82. 391 So. 2d 939 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
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belonging to the owner of an undivided .125 interest is seized by an
inferior creditor, the minimum bid price at the sheriffs sale would
be at least $1 million. 3
The 1981 Legislature amended articles 2298 and 2751 of the
Code of Civil Procedure 4 to expressly allow attorney's fees if an in-
junction is granted halting a sale under a writ of fieri facias or a
sale by executory process. 5 The court has the discretion to award
attorney's fees, but only if it finds that the seizure was "wrongful.""
EXECUTORY PROCESS
Myers v. United States" involved a determination of when a
federal tax lien survives a sale by executory process. A first mort-
gage was held by a bank. The debtor defaulted and the bank in-
stituted executory proceedings. At the time of the filing of the suit
for executory process, there was a federal tax lien recorded against
the property. After the institution of executory proceedings, but
more than thirty days prior to the sheriff's sale, a second federal tax
lien was placed on the property. No notice was ever given to the In-
ternal Revenue Service of the suit. The bank purchased the property
at the sheriff's sale and the clerk of court cancelled the inscription
of all inferior encumbrances, including both federal tax liens. The
bank then sold the property to the plaintiff, Myers. After Myers
purchased the property, the government served the original debtor
with a levy and served a notice of seizure on Myers. Myers contended
that the levy was wrongful because the second tax lien,88 recorded
after the institution of executory proceedings, was properly cancelled
after the sheriff's sale.
83. If the property is sold with appraisal, the price bid must also be at least two-
thirds of the appraised value. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2336.
84. 1981 La. Acts, No. 301, § 1; 1981 La. Acts, No. 302, § 1.
85. These acts legislatively overrule General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Meyers,
385 So. 2d 245 (La. 1980).
86. The comments to Act 302 state:
The second paragraph of this Article, which was enacted in 1981, is intended to
give the trial judge the discretion to award damages and attorney's fees where
the seizure through executory process was wrongful. It is not intended to require
that damages and attorney's fees be awarded in every case where an injunction is
isud a eml, Wher~e W" insuntion is is ea twue Zt a
or a technical error.
While no similar comment is found under Act 301, because the language of both acts is
substantially identical concerning the award of attorney's fees, presumably the same
interpretation of what constitutes a "wrongful" seizure is applicable.
87. 647 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981), affg 483 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. La. 1980). The lower
court opinion was noted in Rubin. supra note 21, at 398. and criticized in Note,
Discharge of Federal Tax Liens in Executory Proceedings, 41 LA. L. REV. 755 (1981).
88. Meyers conceded that the first tax lien should not have been cancelled. 647
F.2d at 597.
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The court rejected Myers' contention, holding that Louisiana's
executory process is not a "judicial proceeding" under federal tax
law89 and therefore the failure to notify the government meant that
not only the first but also the second tax lien survived the sheriff's
sale."
In light of the decision in Myers, the title examiner may want to
carefully check all erasures of mortgages and liens that occur by virtue
of sale pursuant to executory proceedings to make sure that the In-
ternal Revenue Service was timely notified and that therefore the
erasure of the federal tax lien was effective.
THE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACT
The Deficiency Judgment Act9' prevents a creditor from pursu-
ing a debtor personally following liquidation oi any collateral sectring
the loan unless there is a judicial sale with appraisal. The public
policy the Act represents has been interpreted to make the require-
ment mandatory whether the sales are by judicial proceedings without
appraisal or occur as a result of private sales. 2 Whether the protec-
tion of the Deficiency Judgment Act extends to endorsers, guaran-
tors, and sureties has been the subject of litigation from which two
divergent lines of jurisprudence emerge. The most recent case is
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Smith94 which holds that
sureties are protected by the Deficiency Judgment Act. Therefore,
the creditor was prevented from collecting the deficiency from a
surety after a sale that was not by judicial process with appraisal.
89. As defined in 26 I.R.C. § 7425(a).
90. I.R.C. § 7425 distinguishes between "judicial proceedings" and "other sales." A
federal tax lien filed after the institution of foreclosure proceedings in "judicial sales"
will be discharged even though the government is not notified; however, a federal tax
lien filed after the institution of foreclosure in "other proceedings" will be valid and
will survive the sale if the lien is filed "30 days prior to the sheriff's sale." The court
concluded that the phrase "judicial proceedings," as used in the federal statute, applies
only to judicial sales pursuant to plenary judicial proceedings embodying the pro-
cedures associated with a complete and formal hearing on the merits, as
distinguished from a more informal summary determination. . . . Louisiana's ex-
ecutory process is unquestionably a "judicial proceeding" in the literal sense-it
dloes yequaiye judicial, COT at least a olra.involvement-,; but it WIAS Car shoSyt
of the plenary judicial proceedings described in the committee reports.
647 F.2d at 599.
91. LA. R.S. 13:4106 (Supp. 1952 & 1960), 13:4107 (1950).
92. See, e.g., Farmerville Bank v. Sheen, 76 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1954);
Home Fin. Services v. Walmsley, 176 So. 415 (Orl. Cir. 1937).
93. For a discussion of the two conflicting lines of jurisprudence see, Comment,
Deficiency Judgments in Louisiana, 40 TUL. L. REV. 1094 (1975).
94. 399 So. 2d 1285 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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The language of the Deficiency Judgment Act applies to "a
mortgagee or other creditor."9 In Justice v. Caballero," this
language was held sufficiently broad to include a creditor whose
note was Secured by a vendor's priliege, 'howevjer, in. Ouachita
Equipment Rental v. Baker Brush Co.,"1 it was held to be not broad
enough to include an equipment lessor. Relying on the supreme
court's decision in Executive Car Leasing Co. of New Orleans v.
Allodex Corp.," the court in Ouachita Equipment held that the
public policy behind the Deficiency Judgment Act was simply not
applicable to leases. The implicit assumption is that there is no
"sale" when the lessor repossesses his own property, even though
the lessee is liable for accelerated future rentals or stipulated liqui-
dated damages.
PRIVATE WORKS ACT
P.H.A.C. Services, Inc. v. Seaway International, Inc." held that
subcontractors who furnish labor and materials used in constructing
living quarters for use in an offshore drilling platform are entitled
to a privilege under the Private Works Act. The court reasoned that
the platform was a "building" or "other construction." The court
rested its interpretation on the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding
that a fixed drilling platform is a building within the meaning of
Civil Code article 2322'" and upon the fact that the corresponding
term for building found in French Civil Code article 518 "particularly
applies to structures which serve as habitations."''1 The court's opi-
niorn is n'arrowly draw%%. The oinion may leave rom for an~ argu-
ment that portable or submersible drilling platforms, or drilling plat-
forms not used for habitation, may not be the kinds of immovables
upon which Private Works Act claims may be asserted.
For the first time in almost sixty years' 2 the Private Works Act
has been completely overhauled. Acts 1981, No. 724 completely
reenacted and amended Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4801 et seq.
In 1977 House Concurrent Resolution No. 150 directed the Law
Institute to clarify the often confusing and contradictory terms of
96. LA. WS., d8616 Lpa . IS 2 & i%.
96. 393 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
97. 388 So. 2d 477 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
98. 279 So. 2d 169 (La. 1973).
99. 393 So. 2d 117 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
100. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co.. 365 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1979).
101. 393 So. 2d at 122.
102. The Private Works Act was enacted by 1922 La. Acts, No. 139; all the provi-
sions were modified substantially by 1926 La. Acts, No. 298.
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the Private Works Act."3 For almost four years, the Law Institute
worked on drafting an acceptable proposal. The Institute's efforts
throughout were to restate the law so as to preserve its basic policy
decisions, and to place the law into some type of logical and consis-
tent theoretical framework."' After extensive discussion and revi-
sions, ' 5 the Law Institute's bill was submitted to the legislature by
Representatives Simoneaux and Gaudin, and by Senator Casey."
Practitioners who are accustomed to the old Act will find no
basic surprises or substantial alterations. As originally proposed,
and as subsequently enacted, the new law preserves the policy pro-
visions of the old Act. The persons who are able to obtain privileges
are unchanged. The rank of the privileges is unchanged. The need to
record some type of notice in the public records of the entering into
of a contract, and the need to record a notice of one's claim is also
unchanged, although the specifics of what must be recorded are
somewhat different.
The changes made by the legislature in response to the Law In-
stitute's proposal were minimal. Hearings were first held by the
House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure. The bill at that time
contemplated eliminating the dual filing periods in which 30 days
was allowed to file lien claims if the contract was recorded, and 60
days if no contract was timely recorded; House Bill 900 provided a
single 45 day period. Although minor technical amendments were
made to the bill in the House Committee, the major change was to
extend the single 45 day period to 60 days.
103. House Concurrent Resolution No. 150 of the 1977 regular session of the Loui-
siana Legislature reads:
WHEREAS, the lien laws under Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950
are complex and often times confusing and contain many duplications; and
WHEREAS, in order to provide better enforcement of the provisions of the lien
laws in this state an in-depth study should be made of every aspect of the lien
laws with a view toward a more clear and workable statement of these laws.
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the House of Representatives of the
Legislature of the State of Louisiana, the Senate thereof concurring, that the
Louisiana Law Institute is hereby authorized and directed to study and propose a
revision of the lien laws under Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950
so as to clarify and simplify the lien laws and the enforcement thereof. BE IT
FUJRTH RESOLVED that the Louisiana Law Institute be requested to submit
a written report of its study, together with any specific proposals for legislation
to the 1978 regular session.
104. Memorandum of October 8, 1979 from Tom Harrell, reporter of the Private
Works Act, to members of the Louisiana Law Institute Security Devices and Advisory
Committee. The original of this document can be examined at the Louisiana Law In-
stitute, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
105. See, for example, the minutes of the meeting of the Louisiana State Law In-
stitute's Council on November 7 and 8, December 12 and 13, 1980.
106. La. H.B. 900, § 1, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981).
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When the bill reached the Senate Committee the single 60 day
period was reduced to 30 days. In addition, some concern arose as to
whether those who did grading and clearing work on property
should be accorded a privilege. Utnder the provisions of the old
Act,' °7 those who did grading work were not accorded a privilege.
The Law Institute's draft' ° sought to incorporate the substance of
old Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:4819 prior to its 1979 amendments
by reinstituting a privilege for grading and clearing work. Amend-
ments made on the floor of the Senate after it left the Senate com-
mittee substantially accomplished this goal.' 9
Of course, no mere "restatement" of any complex statute can
ever be accomplished without making some substantive changes. In
an effort to compare the provisions of the old Act with those of the
new, following this article is a side-by-side overview of the new and
old Acts. It is by necessity perfunctory, but it is hoped that it wil
give practitioners a handy reference guide with which to analyze the
new Act, which goes into effect on January 1, 1982,10
107. LA. R.S. 9:4819(A) (Supp. 1966, 1968 & 1972), as amended by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 163, § 1.
108. La. H.B. 900, § 1, 7th Reg. Sess. (1981).
109. LA. R.S. 9:4808 (1950) was amended to provide that while there is a privilege
for grading and clearing work, such work is not "separate work." However, the
privilege has no affect "as to third persons acquiring rights." 1981 La. Acts, No. 724, §
1, adding LA. R.S. 9:4808(C) (Supp. 1981).
110. 1981 La. Acts, No. 724, § 4.
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